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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK H. PITTS and SANDRA J. 
PITTS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 15010 
KIMBERLY B. McLACHLAN and 
CRAIG McLACHLAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from Order of District Judge, Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow, denying plaintiff's Motion for Relief 
under Rule 60 (b) (7). 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs obtained a Summary Judgment against the 
defendants on May 6, 1976, for the balance of principal plus 
interest, attorneys' fees, taxes and costs upon a real estate 
contract attached to the Amended Complaint (R. 22), which 
Judgment recites that the defendants did not appear. Writ 
of Execution issued October 15, 1976 (R. 29), and a sale was 
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made to the plaintiffs on November 16, 1976 (R. 32). Plaintiffs 
on December 6, 1976, filed a Motion for Relief from Summary 
Judgment under Rule 60(b) (7) setting forth that the defendant 
Craig McLachlan was a substantial judgment debtor; that the 
buyer under the Uniform Real Estate Contract was Kimberly B. 
McLachlan and asking that the Summary Judgment be amended to 
show Kimberly B. McLachlan as the person to whom title passed 
by reason of the judgment and Craig McLachlan as surety (R. 33-34), 
A proposed Amended Summary Judgment was attached to the Motion 
and it is admitted that this was inadvertently signed by the 
Court (R. 46). Contradictory minute entries were made (R. 47 
and 48) and it is admitted that the minute entry at R. 47 was 
made inadvertently. The ruling of the Court is contained in 
the Order Denying Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment signed 
January 18, 19 77 (R. 49) • It is from this Order Denying Relief 
that the appeal was taken (R. 51) . 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
By this appeal plaintiffs-appellants ask this Court 
to rule that the District Court's Order Denying Relief was 
made and entered wrongfully, both because the Motion was properly 
filed under subdivision (7) of Rule 60 (b) and because the Court 
did have before it a subject matter upon which to act, namely 
the Judgment of May 6, 1976, despite the fact of an execution 
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sale. The District Court should be directed either to grant 
the Motion or reconsider it under subdivision 60(b) (7). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the threshold appellants ask this Court to ignore 
portions of the file transmitted by the Clerk of the District 
court, not included in the Designation of Contents of Record 
on Appeal and not properly before the District Court at the 
time of the hearing on the Motion for Relief on December 15, 
1976. These documents are: 
1. The Execution issued May 14, 1976 (R. 23). 
2. The Sheriff's notice of May 19, 1976 (R. 24). 
3. The publication of notice by the Sheriff of 
June 7, 1976 (R. 25). 
4. The cancellation of the Sheriff's sale ~R. 26). 
5. The Execution of September 24, 1976 (R. 27). 
6. Another copy of the Sheriff's notice of May 19, 
1976 (R. 28). 
7. A letter from David M. Bown to Judge Snow dated 
December 16, 1976 (R. 38). 
B. Agreement for cancellation of Execution Sale of 
June 14, 1976 (R. 39-42). 
9. Additional copy of Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(R. 43-44). 
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The Statement of Facts will not include references to 
any of the foregoing documents. 
The parties entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
on October 7, 1975 reciting the plaintiffs as Seller and Kimber! 
B. McLachlan as Buyer (R. 4), with a provision in Paragraph 19 
that 
"The Seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the time and in the 
manner above mentioned agrees to execute and 
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and 
sufficient warranty deed * * * 
At the end of the contract Kimberly B. McLachlan signed and 
below that was the signature admitted to be Craig McLachlan 
and below the second signature was the word "Buyer". 
The Amended Complaint alleges that defendants made 
certain payments and that on the due date of the balance, 
January 8, 1976, the balance owing was $29,333.57 plus taxes 
and interest (R. 9). The Answer was a general denial (R. 11). 
On April 15, 1976, plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment supported by an Affidavit setting forth 
the balances owing, the taxes and raising an issue as to 
payment of attorneys' fees, to be reserved or resolved by 
the parties (R. 13 and 15). The Summary Judgment reflects 
agreement between the parties on the matter of attorneys' 
fees and withholding of entry of the Judgment for a week 
and is dated May 6, 1976 (R. 22). This Judgment recites 
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"That the plaintiffs have judgment against the 
defendants jointly and severally in the amount 
of $29,333.57 principal* * *." 
The Sheriff's Certificate of Execution Sale discloses 
that the price bid by the plaintiffs included all of the 
principal of the Judgment plus interest and also two items 
of $250 and $750, which are not explained (R. 32). Plaintiffs-
Appellants admit that the full amount of the Judgment was bid 
for the property. 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Relief from the 
form of the Summary Judgment, pointing out that Craig McLachlan 
had many judgment creditors, one of whom had commenced an action 
upon the theory that the entry of the Summary Judgment as above 
described passed title to the real estate involved in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to both of the defendants and not 
just to Kimberly B. McLachlan. This Motion also alleges that 
the result of the requested action would give the defendants 
additional time to pay for the property, would avoid a windfall 
to the judgment creditors of Craig McLachlan "at the expense of 
plaintiffs" and that correction of the Judgment would perform 
the contract "in the manner contemplated by the contract and 
the parties at the time the contract was entered into." Attached 
to the Motion for Relief was a form of Amended Summary Judgment, 
which was inadvertently signed (R. 46). The proposed relief 
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was that the plaintiffs have judgment 
"* * * against the defendant Kimberly B. McLachlan 
as purchaser under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and the defendant Craig McLachlan as unsecured 
guarantor of the said Real Estate Contract * * * " 
This Motion was argued before the District Judge on December 15, 
1976, with appearances by Richard Bird, David Bown and Stephen 
McCaughey (R. 45) and taken under advisement by the Court. 
Conflicting minute entries were made as to disposition of the 
matter on December 28, 1976 (R. 47-48), and on January 18,1977 
the Court signed an Order Denying the Motion of plaintiffs 
" * * * for the reasons that the basis for the 
motion apparently falls under Subparagraph (1) 
and is not timely and for the further reason 
that the judgment has been satisfied and is no 
longer subject to the action of this Court." 
(R. 49) 
Appellants urge the following issues before this Court: 
1. Rule 60(b) (1) is not the exclusive remedy where 
inadvertence is one factor. 
2. The execution sale did not preclude relief to 
plaintiffs. 
3. Subdivision (7) of Rule 60(b) should be applied 
to plaintiffs' motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RULE 60(b) (1) IS NOT THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
WHERE INADVERTENCE IS ONE FACTOR 
The Motion for Relief which plaintiffs filed (R. 33) 
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admits inadvertency by alleging in Paragraph 2: 
"Plaintiffs were not aware of the existence of 
judgment creditors of Craig McLachlan * * * " 
Inadvertence is here used broadly, there appearing to be no 
value in distinguishing between "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect" as set out in subdivision (1). 
The Motion for Relief also alleges the filing of an 
action by a judgment creditor of Craig McLachlan, that modifying 
the summary Judgment would give defendants additional time in 
which to perform the contract, that amending the Summary Judgment 
would avoid a windfall to the defendants and the judgment 
creditors of Craig McLachlan at the expense of plaintiffs, 
and would give performance of the contract in the manner 
contemplated by the parties. Plaintiffs submit that these 
are reasons independent, or partly independent of the 
"inadvertence" in not discovering the judgment creditors 
of Craig McLachlan (R. 35 and 36). 
The introductory language to Rule 60(b) requires a 
liberal construction: 
"Upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative* * *." 
A liberal construction would mean that courts would not endeavor 
to place reasons under the restrictions of subdivisions (1), 
(2) and (3) , but would incline to place the reasons under sub-
division (7) (subdivision (6) in the Federal Rules) so as to 
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avoid the time limitation. The time limitation from the first 
subdivisions are one (1) year under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and three (3) months under the Utah Rule, thus · exertlng 
additional pressure for a liberal construction to afford relief 
in the interests of justice. 
The question of broad or narrow interpretation of 
Federal Rule 60(b) (6) was the subject of an annotation in 61 
Yale Law Journal starting at page 76, entitled "Federal Rule 
60 (b): Relief from Civil Judgments. 11 Starting at page 82, the 
annotator draws these conclusions: 
"But the Court's principle that 60(b) (6) and 
other.clauses of 60(b) are mutually exclusive 
has not been adhered to in practice. Court 
interpretations of the excusable neglect pro-
visions in 60(b) (1) have been so broad that, 
when read together with 60(b) (2) through (5), 
apparently few fact situations remain to call 
60(b) (6) into play. Nevertheless, courts 
immediately resorted to 60(b) (6) as a mandate 
'to accomplish justice.' In many situations 
they ignored entirely the mutual exclusiveness 
of 60(b) (6) and other clauses of 60(b). On 
other occasions, even where the principle was 
announced, it was given only lip service. Con-
sequently, almost every grant of relief under 
60(b) (6) could have fallen under 60(b) (1) or 
other clauses of 60(b). 
"The effect of the cases under 60(b) (6) establishes 
the clause as a way of circumventing the one 
year time limit in 60 (b) (1), (2), and (3). 11 
In United States v. Karahalias, (2nd Cir. 1953), 205 
F. 2d 331, the defendant brought a motion for relief under Rule 
60(b) claiming that the illness of his wife and his inability 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-9-
to return to the United States from Greece had prevented him 
from taking this step earlier. Judge Learned Hand discussed 
the relationship of subdivisions (1) , (2) and (3) to subdivision 
(6) and said: 
"We think that it was meant to provide for 
situations of extreme hardship, not only 
those, if there be any, that subsections 
(1), (2) and (3) do not cover, but those 
that they do. In short--to put it quite 
baldly--we read the subsection as giving 
the court a discretionary dispensing power 
over the limitation imposed by the Rule 
itself on subsections (1), (2) and (3) 
* * * . " (Page 333) 
On rehearing it was pointed out that the United States Supreme 
Court had applied the Rule more strictly and so Judge Hand 
changed the classification of the conduct from "excusable 
neglect" to other reasons as covered by subdivision (6) but 
still granted the relief. 
In Civil Procedure Cases and Materials by Cound, 
Friendenthal and Miller at page 918, this summary comment is 
made: 
"The proper scope of Rule 60(b) (6) has been 
the subject of considerable litigation. It 
frequently has been held that the Rule must 
have been intended to cover only matters out-
side the scope of Rules 60 (b) (1) to (5). 
[Cases cited] Otherwise the specific time 
limits on motions under Rule 60(b) (1), (2) 
and (3) would be meaningless. But it is the 
existence of these very limits that have 
pressured many courts, in the interests of 
justice, to find that errors ostensibly falling 
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within Rule 60(b) (1), (2) or (3) are somehow 
so special that they come within Rule 60(b) (6) 
and hence are not subject to a specific time 
limitation." 
This Court has also found the need to interpret Rule 
60 (b) in a manner which promotes justice. In Ney v. Harrison, 
5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956), a default judgment was 
entered when the defendant failed to answer a Complaint and 
eleven months later she made application for relief, which was 
granted by the District Court. On appeal one of the questions 
raised was whether that defendant had been properly relieved 
of the default. This Court reviewed Rule 6 0 (b) and noted that 
because eleven months had elapsed before the default was set 
aside, the only basis for the relief would be subdivision (7), 
although her affidavit alleged that she had mistakenly believed 
that she was protected against personal liability by a divorce 
decree. This Court adverted to the policy of the courts to 
permit trials on the merits as .against defaults and then made 
this comment at page 220: 
"The trial court could well regard this as among 
the class of cases that Rule 60(b) (7) was intended 
to govern and to permit Alda to justify her failure 
to answer on the ground that the divorce decree 
required her husband to bear the obligation and 
required him to defend the action for her." 
Ney was considered by this Court again in Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976). A default judgment 
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had been entered in a divorce action and after five and two-
thirds months the defendant moved to set it aside for fraud 
and the District Court held that the motion was not in time 
ooder subdivision (3). This Court affirmed the refusal of the 
District Court to set the default aside, found that the 
appellant had other remedies available, and then reviewed 
the ~ case, in contemplation of the dissenting opinion in 
Kessimakis, and observed that even though the Ney case was 
decided "upon a basis not urged in the trial of the case, that 
is no reason to overrule it here. " This seems to leave the 
law in Utah available for relief to promote justice, even 
though the strict time limits have passed under the first three 
s~divisions, and free to impose the time limits where justice 
does not require relief. Relief was granted by this·approach 
in Bros Incorporated v. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594 at 609; 
Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 at 235 (App. D.C. 1964); 
~ v. Schiek's Inc., 145 N.W.2d 548 at 552 (Minn. 1966). 
In the instant case, the plaintiffs sold their home 
~der contract requiring in effect that it be paid for some 
four months later. It is plain from the record that the 
defendants have not paid for the house and that all the 
plaintiffs wanted was to get their home back and so the full 
amount of their judgment was bid at execution sale. If, by 
reason of the Summary Judgment the title in the home passed to 
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both defendants, subjecting a portion of it to the claims of 
the creditors of Craig McLachlan, the plaintiffs would be 
deprived of a portion of their property in favor of a windfall 
to persons not parties to the proceedings and not purchasers in 
any sense, as well as getting Craig a substantial unearned and 
unjustly enriching credit on his judgments. 
"In the furtherance of justice" a case is made out, 
as in Ney to grant relief even though inadvertence is a factor 
in appellants' predicament. 
POINT II 
THE EXECUTION SALE DID NOT PRECLUDE RELIEF TO PLAINTIFFS 
Rule 69 (g) (2), U.R.C.P., permits a purchaser at execu-
tion sale who does not obtain the property for which he bid to 
file a motion to revive the judgment. This relief is similar 
to, but not identical with, the relief being sought by the 
appellants. The effect of the Rule is that although a judgment 
may have been satisfied by execution, it is not gone forever 
but is dormant and may be revived. 
Continental National Bank & Trust Co. v. J. H. Seely 
& Sons Co., 94 Utah 357, 77 P.2d 355, 115 A.L.R. 543 (1938), 
was brought under Section 104-37-38, U.C.A. (1933) and contains 
a provision similar to what is now Rule 69 (g) (2). In that case 
a judgment was obtained which supported an execution sale of 
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personal property and the judgment was satisfied. The sale 
was held to be void and upon application of the plaintiff, the 
judgment was revived and thereafter a transcript was obtained 
and filed in Emery County upon which an execution issued and 
a sale of real property was held. The defendants moved to 
set aside the sale in Emery County as being void because the 
judgment had been satisfied by the original execution sale and: 
"In support of such position it is argued that 
'the satisfaction of the original judgment 
extinguished it entirely and forever.' Plaintiff, 
on the other hand, takes the position that a 
revival order made pursuant to that statute does 
just as the words imply; that is, it reinstates 
the original judgment in full force and effect 
* * * . " (Pages 360-361) 
The court held that the original judgment was revived and that 
it had not been extinguished by the first execution sale. This 
Court went on to consider the writ of scire facias as affording 
comparable relief and which had not been extinguished by statute 
in the State of Utah and which affords similar relief, observing: 
"In this State, as in most of the states which 
have adopted reformed Codes of Civil Procedure, 
the objects sought by scire facias may generally 
be accomplished by some other remedy." (Page 366) 
The annotation which follows continental v. Seely at 
115 A.L.R. 549, finds this statute to be not unusual and "being 
of a remedial nature, should receive a liberal construction." 
(Page 550) And citing a Tennessee case at page 553, states: 
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"Likewise, under the Tennessee statute, it is 
held that the fact that the purchaser is also 
the plaintiff in the execution makes no difference 
with respect to his statutory right to have the 
judgment revived, so long as his conduct is not 
such as to repel him from the court." 
A comparable analysis of the law on failure of title 
of an execution purchaser is contained in Section 1038 of 47 
Arn.Jur.2d. 
The language of Rule 69(g) {2) does not quite fit 
appellants' position in this case, but this Rule offers relief 
comparable to the relief which appellants seek; thus bearing 
out not only the persistence of the judgment against the claim 
of extinction but supporting the general equitable principle 
that a purchaser at execution sale who is disappointed in the 
result and finds his expected purchase in part diminished may 
have relief. This is a strong evidence of "another reason" 
justifying relief under subdivision (7) of Rule 60(b). 
POINT III 
SUBDIVISION (7) OF RULE 60(b) SHOULD 
BE APPLIED TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
Appellants subrni t that the en try of the summary Judgment 
whether it be called an election of remedies, a performance of 
the contract, or a payment of the price of the land, if it 
accomplished the transfer of title at all transferred it to 
Kimberly B. McLachlan. There was an equity in Kimberly B. 
McLachlan as the Buyer under the original contract and under 
-
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the language of the contract, Paragraph 19 (R. 5), upon 
payment of the price, the title was to go to Kimberly B. 
McLachlan or her assigns. None of the process of litigation 
amounted to an assignment by Kimberly B. McLachlan; therefore, 
~ything that passed by reason of the Summary Judgment passed 
to her. 
Appellants have not been able to find a case precisely 
in point and refer the Court to Houston Oil Co.v. Randolph, 
(Tex. 1923). 251 S.W. 794, 28 A.L.R. 926. It is there stated: 
"A vendor who obtains a judgment for the unpaid 
purchase money will be presumed to have received 
full satisfaction of his debt thereby." 
The judgment there obtained was against the principal and his 
s~eties on the note, the execution sale involving property 
of the principal. The court held that by reason of the execu-
tion sale for the unpaid purchase money, the title passed to 
the principal and not to the sureties. The intent of the 
parties is plain from the documents here involved that 
Kimberly B. McLachlan was the buyer and she and her husband 
both signed as performers of the contract. 
On the assumption that an interest in the land passed 
to Kimberly B. McLachlan only, appellants are entitled to con-
sideration under subdivision (7) of Rule 60(b) for two reasons: 
(a) to avoid multiplicity of actions, and (b) such relief is just 
~d equitable and gives the defendants further time to complete 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
their purchase of the property. 
If appellants are wrong in taking the position that 
Craig McLachlan received no interest in the property, then 
relief should be granted for two additional reasons: (c) to 
prevent a windfall to the creditors of Craig McLachlan, and 
(d) in furtherance of justice to the appellants not to deprive 
them of their asset as anticipated in the execution sale. 
A. 
To Avoid Multiplicity of Actions 
The Motion for Relief alleges that one action has 
been filed by a judgment creditor of Craig McLachlan (R. 33) 
and Exhibit A attached to the Motion shows that this judgment 
is for $20,045.40 and that there are five additional judgment 
creditors whose claims total more than $27,762.70. It is 
plain that all of these claims would have to be litigated, 
either by interpleading them in the action already filed or 
by waiting until the other judgment creditors file similar 
claims. Granting the relief prayed for would eliminate these 
actions, and undoubtedly eliminate the one which has already 
been filed since modification of the judgment to accord wiili 
the contract would undoubtedly avoid trial in the action already 
filed. 
Avoidance of multiplicity of actions is one of the 
classic grounds for equitable relief. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equi~ 
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n 46, 47 and 192. 
B. 
such Relief is Just and Equitable to the Defendants 
It appears from the Affidavit of plaintiffs in support 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment that the defendants had 
made some payments on the contract, one of them dated December 
15, 1975 (R. 15). And it also appears from the Summary 
Judgment itself that the attorney for the defendants had 
conferred with attorney for the plaintiffs and had not 
contested the motion, provided an additional week's time 
was give~ to the defendants (R. 22) • 
If the Motion for Relief were granted, it would 
automatically give the defendants additional timee, since 
the modification of the summary Judgment would undercut the 
execution sale, requiring further proceedings and giving the 
defendants that addi tiona! time. 
There would be further equity in favor of defendants, 
in that the price of purchase would be $31,119.40 (R. 32) 
instead of the original purchase price of $32,500. 
It appears that equitable treatment of the other 
party is contemplated by the requirements of Rule 60 (b) that 
the relief be in furtherance of justice. 
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c. 
To Prevent a Windfall to the 
Creditors of Craig McLachlan 
If the interpretation of the original contract of 
sale and of the Summary Judgment as entered should be that 
title to the property has passed to both of the defendants, 
subject to the judgment liens of the creditors of Craig 
McLachlan as to his interest, there would obviously be a 
substantial loss and damage to the plaintiffs with unjust 
enrichment to Craig McLachlan through being relieved of a 
portion of his judgments and a windfall or unjust enrichment 
to the creditors of Craig McLachlan. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, § 28 
indicates that this is a ground for equitable relief. 
American Employers v. Sybil Realty, (E.D. La. 1967) 
270 F.Supp. 566, 11 F.R.Serv.2d 60(b)28, case 1, involved a 
motion under subdivision (5) of Federal Rule 60(b) seeking 
relief because of a mistake in the date of a transaction, 
which, as originally testified and applied, resulted in a 
large recovery under a writ of garnishment. The relief 
sought was to correct the date and therefore eliminate from 
the effectiveness of the garnishment approximately $8,000. 
It was argued that the garnishee was not entitled to this 
relief because subdivision (5) has language indicating that 
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it can have only prospective application. The court applied 
swdivision (6) of the Federal Rule and modified the judgment 
50 as to reduce the amount of judgment taken by the writ of 
garnishment. This is a parallel situation as to relief, 
because the basis of the motion was a mistake but the result 
of the mistake and action was a windfall and unjust enrich-
ment. 
Williams v. United States, 138 u.s. 514, 34 L.Ed. 
1026, 11 S.Ct. 457, is cited in 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, § 28, 
~d is authority for a holding that even without the presence 
in the action of the third party who holds title (in that case 
the State of Nevada) in whom the title reposed by reason of 
the mistake involved in the relief sought, the court can grant 
equitable relief by correcting a deed, thereby divesting the 
State of Nevada of the parcel of property and vesting it in 
the person entitled thereto, who was the moving party. 
It appears that no interest has accrued to the 
judgment creditors of Craig McLachlan through the entry of 
the Summary Judgment in this case and there would be no 
inequity to those judgment creditors if the summary Judgment 
were corrected to make plain that it is Kimberly McLachlan 
and not Craig McLachlan to whom the interest was transferred. 
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D. 
In Furtherance of Justice to the Appellants Not to Deprive 
Them of Their Asset as Anticipated in the Execution Sale 
As previously pointed out, relief is given under Rule 
69(g) (2) to a purchaserr at an execution sale, including the 
judgment creditor, if the property which he buys in and for 
which he tentatively commits his valuable judgment is not 
realized. This is also consistent with the relief indicated 
in 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 523, that in an action 
by a vendor for purchase money under a real estate contract, the 
judgment given should adjust equities so as to do substantial 
justice. If the defendants had resisted this action on the 
merits and if all of the facts now known had been disclosed 
to the trial court, it would have been the trial court's duty 
under this Rule to make such judgment as would have done 
justice to the positions of all parties. 
An old case cited in this section of Am.Jur.2d is 
Ziegler, Baker & Co.'s Appeal, 69 Pa. 471 (1871). There a 
purchaser paid some purchase money, went into possession and 
improved the property. The vendor took a note for the unpaid 
purchase money and conveyed the legal title to a third party. 
The vendor obtained judgment and the property was sold at execution 
sale. In distributing the proceeds of sale, it appeared that 
there was a mechanic's lien which antedated the judgment and 
the holder of which made a claim. The court held that since 
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the judgment was a purchase money judgment, the judgment 
creditor was protected against the intervening lien, and the 
court observed: 
"Vendors are usually regarded as the most 
meritorious creditors, and it would be refining 
against reason so to apply the Rule as to protect 
other creditors, and cut out vendors." 
The court further reasoned: 
"In the present case, therefore, the judgment 
of Gress for the purchase money fastened upon 
the legal estate the instant he conveyed to 
Thomas his vendee. The equitable and legal 
titles united and merged, and Gress' security 
expanded with the enlargement of his vendee's 
estate. What harm was done to the mechanics' 
lien creditors? They had a lien only on Thomas' 
equitable estate when Gress entered his judgment. 
Had they, or any other creditor, sold the equitable 
interest before the legal title was added, they 
would have sold subject to the vendor's purchase 
money, by virtue of his retained legal title, 
and the bid at the Sheriff's sale would have 
been diminished to the same extent, and the 
vendor could have taken nothing under his 
judgment. * * * Thus, the adding of the deed 
to the vendee's interest did the appellants 
neither good nor harm, and certainly ought 
not to work an injury to the vendor." (Pages 
473, 474) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants presented to the District Court, and now 
present to this Court a case involving more than inadvertence. 
There are involved equitable principles of unjust enrichment, 
circuity of action and multiplicity of actions, an unsolicited 
windfall to third parties and serious injury to the appellants 
within the meaning of Rule 69 (g) (2). Rule 60 (b) (7) should 
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be liberally interpreted in furtherance of justice and the 
Court should not inequitably limit appellants to the three 
months' period of Rule 60(b) (l). The defendants were wrong 
in arguing, and the Court was misled in the second reason 
given, namely that the Court did not have power to revive 
the judgment, which is plainly established by Rule 69(g)(2). 
This Court could and should make the decision that 
the basis for relief under subdivision (7) was made out and 
instruct the trial court to grant the Motion for Relief. 
l 
Res/1.~lly :ubmi~ ~o( t}. 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants · 
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